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Abstract 
 
 
Ecological threats continue to proliferate at a worrisome pace and in many 
circumstances defy efforts to neutralize them.  Mounting concerns about the 
gap between the scale of biophysical disruption and policy performance have 
stimulated both academic and engineering-type interest in the effectiveness/ 
consequences of environmental governance regimes.  An issue which has not 
received sufficient attention is the degree to which such regulatory 
mechanisms are in tune with their socio-institutional setting rather than 
merely the natural systems which they aim to safeguard.  China’s experience 
suggests that this is a question which merits close examination. 
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THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE REGIMES: 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE PRACTICES 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The past three decades have witnessed a surge of interest in governance 
regimes intended to shape, and in certain circumstances capable of shaping, 
the behaviour of actors in the political arena, both domestic and international.  
The concept was introduced formally in 1975, when it was defined as ‚a set of 
mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and 
financial commitments, which have been accepted by a [relevant] group of 
[participants in the political process+‛ (Ruggie, 1975, p. 570). 
 
This initial depiction provided the impetus to an extensive exploration of the 
idea floated, but as theoretical development and empirical investigation 
increased in scope and intensified, the need emerged for a broader and more 
elaborate formula.  A definition satisfying these requirements was produced 
at a subsequent conference focused on examining methodically the analytical 
characteristics of governance regimes.  The conclusion arrived at was that 
they constitute: 
‚sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given< *political domain+. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice‛ (Krasner, 1983, p. 2). 
 
This portrayal revolves around four elements: principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures.  The distinctions may be easier to discern at the 
conceptual than practical level.  The underlying hierarchical configuration 
 4 
however appears to be fundamentally sound, featuring sequential movement 
from the general/strategic to the specific/operational components.  Despite a 
certain degree of imprecision, this continues to be the most widely embraced 
definition of a governance regime, or at least one commonly employed as a 
starting point in research on the subject, which remains very much in the 
academic limelight. 
 
Such research typically possesses prescriptive connotations.  The primary 
objective is to identify regime structures and processes that have the potential 
to enhance social welfare in domestic and international political settings, 
convert them into smoothly functioning institutional entities and ensure that 
they are complied with.  At times though the work conducted in this area is 
inspired by predominantly descriptive or explanatory considerations.  A 
recent example is a study of the relationship between governance regimes, 
corruption and economic growth (Aidt, Dutta and Sena, 2008). 
 
Environmental scholars generally adopt the established notion of a 
governance regime as outlined in the economics/political science literature 
(‚regimes are social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, 
rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in 
specific areas‛; Young and Levy, 1999, p. 1).  Since their concerns tend to be 
more concrete in nature, they tend however to gravitate towards the 
individual elements of the definition, and differentiate between prevailing 
orders and regimes. 
 
The former are ‚broad, framework arrangements governing the activities of 
all (or almost all) the members of [domestic or] international society over a 
wide range of specific issues‛ (Young, 1989, p. 13).  The latter, ‚by contrast, 
are more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, 
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resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the 
members of *domestic or+ international society‛ (Young, 1989, p. 13).  This 
distinction is useful, but not essential in many ecological research contexts. 
 
The academic writings on environmental governance regimes, which in the 
final analysis are prescriptively oriented, have followed a certain pattern that 
is presented in the next section.  It is argued in this paper that this pattern 
may be augmented by incorporating a perspective grounded in descriptive 
(as distinct from normative) decision theory (or, more broadly, where 
appropriate, its organization counterpart).  The Chinese ecological policy 
experience is invoked for that purpose in order to provide the necessary 
empirical illustrations. 
 
Current Research Orientation 
 
The early work undertaken in this investigative domain was characterized by 
intellectually adversarial exchanges regarding the viability of the concept of a 
governance regime.  This phase has largely run its course.  Some resistance to 
the idea surfaces occasionally in a mild form, but there is now a consensus 
that this rather abstract construct is both meaningful and useful (the same 
applies to the related, yet not one to be employed synonymously, notion of 
social institutions; Young, 2004). 
 
The research agenda pursued presently is multi-dimensional in nature.  It 
encompasses regime characteristics, regime types/variations, regime 
formation, regime change and regime effectiveness/consequences (Young, 
1982; Young, 1989; Young, 1994; Young, 1997; Vogler, 2000; Young, 2002; 
Young, King and Schroeder, 2008).  The attention accorded to these individual 
facets of the phenomenon however is not equally divided.  The picture 
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inevitably evolves over time, but the focus has shifted lately to regime 
effectiveness/consequences (Wettestad, 1999; Young, 1999; Miles et al., 2002; 
Underdal and Young, 2004). 
 
This is an analytical sphere not lacking in ambiguities.  Considerable effort 
has thus been directed towards reducing them.  For example, effectiveness 
has been traditionally viewed in terms of progress achieved in moving 
towards specific regime goals. (‚The objective of the regime for biological 
diversity is to prevent losses of biodiversity occurring as side effects or 
externalities of actions designed to promote economic development and other 
similar objectives.  The natural way to assess the performance of this regime is 
to evaluate its impact on rates of change in losses of biodiversity at the genetic, 
species and ecosystem level.‛ Young, 2004, p. 5). 
 
Such a narrow construction however overlooks cross-regime influences, 
which may be substantial.  The point is that regimes may have wider 
ramifications than implied by their narrowly-defined goals and those may 
have to be taken into account in evaluating their performance.  This has 
prompted environmental researchers to draw a distinction between simple 
effectiveness and broader consequences. (‚Is the protection of whales an issue 
in its own right< or is it merely a subset of a broader issue area 
encompassing human interactions with marine mammals.‛ Young, 2004, p. 6). 
 
This is not just a definitional matter, but one which has an unavoidable 
practical side.  Problems examined through well-adjusted lens often appear to 
be amenable to a concrete solution within a certain time period.  In domains 
where broader consequences manifest themselves on a large scale, that is 
seldom the case.  Indeed, problems may then require ‚ongoing efforts and< 
periodic adjustments in governing arrangements to ensure that they are 
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properly adapted to changing circumstances‛ (Young, 2004, p. 6).  In such 
instances, ‚the operation of regimes gives rise to new insights about the 
problem at stake or even to new ways of defining or framing the problems in 
contrast to yielding decisive solutions to the problems as originally framed‛ 
(Young, 2004, p. 6). 
 
The distinction between simple effectiveness and broader consequences 
overlaps with that between internal and external impacts, as well as direct 
and indirect ones.  Internal impacts are mostly confined to the sphere of 
regime operations, as narrowly conceived.  Reverberations possessing greater 
amplitudes qualify as external.  The directness/indirectness of impacts is the 
function of the length of the causal chain linking the regime to its behavioural 
ramifications.  Direct impacts are connected via a short chain and indirect 
ones through a long one (Young and Levy, 1999; Young, 2004).  Attempts to 
come to grips with such basic, yet subtle, distinctions are a prominent feature 
of current research on environmental governance regimes. 
 
Methodological issues – pertaining to the operationalization, measurement 
and attribution of effectiveness/consequences – also loom large on the present 
scholarly agenda.  They are typically formulated in terms of three questions:  
(1) What precisely constitutes the object to be assessed? (2) Against which 
standard is this object to be assessed? (3) How to proceed to compare the object 
to this standard – or, to express it differently, what kind of measurement 
operations to perform in order to attribute a certain score of effectiveness to a 
certain regime? (Underdal, 2002a; Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 
2004; Mitchell, 2008; Underdal, 2008). 
 
The scope of the object has expanded to include not just the positive/negative 
effects/consequences associated with regime operations, but also those 
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realized in the process of establishing/maintaining it.  These are organized 
within a system-type framework in which inputs and outputs (the principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures resulting from regime 
formation) are separated from regime outcomes (i.e., shifts in human 
behaviour) and impacts (i.e., changes in the biophysical environment itself).  
The latter two are at the heart of the methodological development process 
(Underdal, 2002a; Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 2004; Mitchell, 
2008; Underdal, 2008). 
 
Determining an assessment standard entails at least two key steps: 
establishing the point of reference against which actual performance may be 
compared and embracing a standard metric of measurement.  Two points of 
reference have been employed in recent studies focused on environmental 
governance regimes: a hypothetical state of affairs that would have been 
observed had the regime not been formed and some ideal/optimal 
configuration (a rather ambitious, but not unrealistic, aspiration level; 
Underdal, 2002a, Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 2004; Mitchell, 
2008; Underdal, 2008). 
 
The first of these two approaches equates effectiveness (simple and broad) 
with the relative improvement brought by the regime.  The second typically sets 
the standard higher in that the shift induced may fall short of an agreed upon 
ideal/optimum.  The difference is akin in some respects to that between 
satificing and maximizing.  These two perspectives are complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive and they are increasingly blended in empirical 
inquiries (Underdal, 2002a; Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 2004; 
Mitchell, 2008; Underdal, 2008). 
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Determining an assessment standard is an analytical exercise which extends 
beyond generating a reference point against which actual performance could 
be compared.  A standardized metric of evaluation needs also to be adopted.  The 
choice is normally between a scale (preferably interval rather than ordinal) 
geared towards gauging social welfare (usually in terms of economic costs 
and benefits) and one oriented towards measuring environmental 
sustainability or some other relevant biophysical concept.  Again, 
considerable emphasis is placed currently on integrating these two 
viewpoints (Underdal, 2002a; Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 2004; 
Mitchell, 2008; Underdal, 2008). 
 
Operationalizing and gauging factors (the independent variables) that 
impinge on regime effectiveness (the dependent variable) may pose a greater 
challenge than coming to grips empirically with outputs/outcomes/impacts.  
But even on this front substantial progress has been recorded.  A distinction 
has been drawn in the process between malign (e.g., asymmetry, cumulative 
cleavages and incongruity) and benign (e.g., coordination, cross-cutting 
cleavages and symmetry/indeterminate distribution) problems (the former 
impede effectiveness materially, the latter do not), a better understanding has 
emerged regarding sources of diminished problem-solving capacity (e.g., 
distribution of power, institutional setting, and energy/skill or epistemic 
communities/instrumental leadership) and the notion of collaboration has 
been refined.  The relevant concepts have been properly measured rather than 
merely defined (Underdal, 2002a; Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 
2004; Mitchell, 2008; Underdal, 2008). 
 
The issue of research design has also been accorded ample attention.  Clearly, 
the effectiveness of environmental governance regimes cannot be assessed 
adequately in the kind of laboratory settings in which social scientists conduct 
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selectively their scientific investigations.  However, there is potential for 
undertaking natural or quasi-experiments, thought experiments (i.e., relying 
on the method of counterfactuals, whereby a flow of events is reconstructed 
as it would have unfolded in the absence of a regime-related stimulus) and 
exploring systematically the behavioural pathways via which institutions 
produce tangible results (outputs/outcomes/impacts).  This too is an analytical 
domain in which significant forward movement has been witnessed 
(Underdal, 2002a; Underdal, 2002b; Underdal, 2004; Young, 2004; Mitchell, 
2008; Underdal, 2008). 
 
The progress experienced in grappling with fundamental conceptual and 
methodological questions has not been such that the themes pursued have 
been exhausted.  The clarity achieved has nevertheless been sufficient to 
prompt those involved in this scholarly enterprise to proceed in new 
directions (without abandoning the old platforms).  One interesting line of 
inquiry has been aimed at gaining insights into the relationship between 
environmental governance regimes/social institutions and ecosystems, and 
endeavouring to maximize the fit between the two (Young, 2002; Galaz et al., 
2008).  This effort has been part of a broader research agenda (Young, 2002; 
Young, King and Schroeder, 2008) and has reflected a growing realization that 
‚*a+n institutional arrangement that performs perfectly well dealing with one 
environmental problem may be a dismal failure in solving other problems‛ 
(Young, 2002, p. 20). 
 
This is an observation based on robust common sense as well as extensive 
empirical investigation.  Yet, there are gaps in the analytical framework 
derived therefrom.  It is assumed, whether explicitly or implicitly, that in 
order to be effective, an environmental governance regime must be designed 
in a manner ensuring a high degree of fit with the relevant ecosystem.  
 11 
Without disputing this proposition, it is legitimate to argue that the 
relationship between the regime and the institutional setting in which it is 
embedded should also be taken into account.  We explore this notion further 
in the following section. 
 
Complementary Theoretical Perspective 
 
The intricate nature of the interaction between environmental governance 
regimes/social institutions and ecosystems is duly acknowledged by 
contemporary environmental scholars.  This manifests itself in a variety of 
forms, notably the concept of cross-regime effects/consequences and the 
notion of interplay, which refers to the dynamic linkages between the 
different component parts of the socially-contrived and biophysical 
architecture (Young, 2002; Young, King and Schroeder, 2008).  However, 
perhaps because of the profound ecological concerns which the research 
strategy pursued presently represents, governance regimes are expected to 
adapt to the biophysical habitat, but not to the socio-institutional milieu in 
which they are firmly grounded. 
 
It is instructive to juxtapose in this respect the work of environmental scholars 
with that of their legal counterparts.  The latter have sought to devise effective 
governance regimes (for controlling corporate and individual crime) by 
matching them as closely as possible with the socio-institutional/socio-
organizational setting in which they are rooted.  Descriptive decision theory, 
or the partly overlapping organizational equivalent, has provided much of 
the inspiration (in conjunction with microeconomic theory) for this 
undertaking (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993). 
 
 12 
The first piece of legal research on the subject borrowed substantially from a 
seminal study of American institutional responses during the Cuban missile 
crisis (Allison, 1971).  Three models of corporate decision making were 
proposed.  Model I, the rational actor model, posits that corporations are unitary 
rational decision makers.  Model II, the organizational process model, portrays 
the corporate body as a loose coalition of functional organizational sub-units 
(e.g., finance and marketing), each of which is responsible for a narrow range 
of problems, whose resolution is governed by standard operating procedures 
(SOPs).  Model III, the bureaucratic politics model, views the corporation as an 
arena for an ongoing complex bargaining game involving a multiplicity of 
players who advance their claims through a wide range of formal and 
informal channels (Kriesberg, 1976). 
 
The three models have different implications for the design of corporate (and 
individual) criminal sanctions/governance regimes.  Model I suggests that 
sanctions imposed on the decision making unit, the corporate entity, are most 
appropriate and effective when they relate to the particular values (e.g., 
prestige, profit and stability) which rational corporate players seek to 
maximize.  Model II implies that liability should be imposed on the individual 
personnel or a collective corporate vehicle (e.g., safety committee) capable of 
enacting and overseeing SOPs.  Another inference that may be drawn in this 
context is that legal interventions ought to be geared towards ensuring that 
corrective action is taken to remedy deficiencies exhibited by SOPs (e.g., the 
court may appoint a safety expert as a corporate probation officer for this 
purpose; Kriesberg, 1976). 
 
Model III does not depict organizational players as constrained followers of 
pre-selected procedures.  Rather, it portrays them as advocates who 
deliberately endeavour to influence corporate decisions.  Members of the 
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organization do not necessarily direct their actions towards established 
corporate goals, but are often motivated by largely personal considerations 
(e.g., a desire to secure a promotion).  At times, they even embrace the goals 
of other organizations to whom they owe allegiance (e.g., a trade union).  This 
strongly suggests that liability rules should focus squarely on individuals 
(Kriesberg, 1976). 
 
Decision/organization theory revolving around structural institutional 
attributes has also been invoked as a source of inspiration for the design of 
governance regimes for controlling corporate and individual (but solely in 
formal institutional settings) crime.  A typology has thus been constructed 
placing organizations in five distinct categories on the basis of their structural 
characteristics: a simple structure (or virtually no structure at all), a machine 
bureaucracy (which attains coordination via standardization of work 
processes), a professional bureaucracy (which obtains coordination through 
standardization of skills), a divisionalized form (which secures coordination by 
relying on a performance control system) and an adhocracy (where the 
structure is fluid and informal, yet not simple, with a view to encouraging 
initiative and innovation; Mintzberg, 1979; Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993). 
 
Each of these structural configurations possesses unique features which need 
to be reflected in the corresponding governance regime for controlling crime.  
A simple structure is normally dominated by a single chief executive (that 
may operate in tandem with a handful of other senior managers) who should 
bear responsibility for illegal action.  In a machine bureaucracy/technocracy, 
the individual technocrats and the techno-structure collectively are the targets 
for sanctions when legal rules are violated.  In a professional bureaucracy, the 
operating professionals are at the forefront in this respect (e.g., if a hospital 
patient is subjected to a wrong surgical procedure, the doctor in charge is 
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usually regarded as the potential culprit).  In a divisionalized structure, the 
locus of responsibility may lie either with the division at fault alone 
(collectively or certain individuals within it) or in conjunction with corporate 
headquarters (which may exert strong criminogenic pressures on 
organizational units).  Because of its dynamic and elastic structure, allocating 
responsibility within an adhocracy poses considerable challenges and 
requires much ingenuity on the part of those involved (Fisse and Braithwaite, 
1993). 
 
The third conceptual vehicle grounded in descriptive decision/organization 
theory and employed in the quest for a socio-institutionally effective crime 
control governance regime is the dramaturgical model.  It rests on the 
assumption that players in the organizational arena tend to improvise their 
performance within the generally rather broad limits set by the scripts their 
society/institutional milieu makes available to them.  This notion ‚alerts us to 
the fact that the social actor is both character and agent; his part may be 
written for him but it cannot be realized without his agency.  Once the actor 
performs, agency and character are fused and become one‛ (Mangham, 1978, 
p. 25). 
 
The corollary is that players in the organizational arena are subject to a host of 
externally-imposed restrictions and yet exercise meaningful discretion in a 
variety of circumstances: ‚the social actor is constrained by the script 
available to him, but in many, if not most, he has the possibility of choice, the 
potential to create or revise his scripts‛ (Mangham, 1978, p. 27).  The degree to 
which it is necessary to move down in assigning liability for unlawful conduct 
(from the corporate producer to the playwright, and from the director to the 
actor) thus hinges both on the process for generating scripts and on how and 
where discretion is enjoyed for revising them.  The flow of authority within 
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the organization (bottom-up versus top-down) is often a key factor in this 
respect: 
‚Some organisations are so bottom-up that there are no playwrights: 
the scripts are written in a process of negotiation between actors and 
directors. In these organisations, if the script is crimonogenic and its 
execution criminal, responsibility lies with both the actor and the 
director. In top-down organisations, in contrast, scripts are handed 
down to both directors and actors in immutable form. Here we would 
want to charge the playwright and the producer.‛ (Fisse and 
Braithwaite, 1993, p. 110). 
 
The three theoretical perspectives highlighted in this section may be 
expanded further, adjusted in light of institutional realities and synthesized.  
Indeed, two legal researchers have made substantial headway on that front 
(Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993).  Our objective however is not to present the 
scholarly work in this specific domain in a detailed fashion, but to bring into 
focus the importance of achieving a satisfactory fit between governance 
regimes, environmental and others, and their socio-institutional surroundings.  
Having completed that task, we now turn to Chinese ecological management 
for partial (qualitative) empirical validation and as a platform for additional 
reflections. 
 
Implications for China’s Environmental Governance Regime 
 
Surprisingly, given the prominence accorded to economic and political 
priorities, descriptive decision/organization theory has long featured in the 
study of Chinese ecological management, albeit in an intermittent and 
selective manner.  Initially, attention was directed systematically towards the 
implementation (as distinct from formulation) side of the picture.  Three 
contrasting decision models, embraced at various junctures by policy makers 
in China, were proposed: the bureaucratic-authoritative, campaign-
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exhortation and market-exchange types (Ross, 1984; Ross, 1988).  
Subsequently, administrative decentralization was incorporated into the 
cluster (Wu, 2005; Mushkat, 2008; Mushkat, 2009). 
 
Bureaucratic-authoritative implementation is characterized by a high degree 
of centralization, is comprehensive in scope, is spearheaded by the ruling 
party, involves obedience to authoritative commands and is underpinned by 
a system of State/collectively-focused property rights.  Execution of decisions 
via campaign-exhortation is a centralized, uneven, ruling party-driven, 
normatively-inspired (but coercion is also resorted to in order to secure 
compliance) and collectively-oriented (verging on self-abnegation) affair.  
Implementation based on market exchange follows a decentralized, 
comprehensive and materially-incentivized pattern which, by definition, 
relegates the ruling party to the policy periphery and derives its vitality from 
the private ownership of resources (Ross, 1984; Ross, 1988). 
 
Administrative decentralization should not be equated with marketization.  
Power has often been transferred from the political centre in Beijing to the 
provinces (and other sub-national units) without any genuine economic 
reform.  Even the empowerment of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) does not 
amount to economic decentralization if market channels are not restored and 
allowed to function freely.  It has been argued that market-exchange is the 
most effective governance mechanism for implementing environmental policy 
in China and that the alternative configurations should be abandoned (Ross, 
1984; Ross, 1988; Wu, 2005; Mushkat, 2008; Mushkat, 2009). 
 
If the legal insights outlined earlier are relevant, this assertion may not be 
valid at all historical junctures, or at least may have to be supplemented by 
additional observations founded on broader socio-institutional analysis.  The 
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point is that the market-exchange model of strategy execution, even in 
circumstances where market failure is adequately addressed, may not always 
be entirely in tune with the organizational realities that ultimately determine 
the direction and pace of policy action.  To the extent that this is the case, the 
design of governance regimes, in the environmental domain and on other 
fronts, may entail either deviations from a theoretically compelling blueprint 
or complementary measures intended to reinforce it (Elkin, 1986; Stoker, 1989). 
 
A thorough appreciation of the dynamics of public decision making is a 
precondition for offering credible generalizations regarding the 
correspondence between governance regimes and their socio-institutional 
underpinnings.  During the initial phases of the Maoist era, the totalitarianism 
model was the principal intellectual source of such appreciation (Barnett, 1964; 
Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 2004).  It ascribed enormous power to the 
paramount leader and saw the Communist Party’s ubiquitous presence 
(supported by an extensive network of cells, a strict code of obedience and a 
rigid organizational hierarchy) as ‚symptomatic of a ‘totalitarian’ authority 
tightly controlling every aspect of Chinese society‛ (Christiansen and Rai, 
1996, p. 3). 
 
The prevalence of policy conflicts and their intensity throughout this period, 
but particularly from the mid-1950s onwards, cast doubt on the accuracy of 
this one-dimensional portrayal.  Consequently, the two-line struggle and the 
class struggle perspective gained currency following the tumultuous 
experiences of the late 1950s and the 1960s (notably, the Great Leap Forward 
and the Cultural Revolution).  The dramatic rise in the political temperature 
and subsequent adjustments/manifestations of moderation were viewed as 
the product of an ongoing tension between a strategic thrust geared towards 
mass mobilization (proletarian-revolutionary line) and bureaucratic politics 
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(bourgeois-reactionary line; Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; 
Heggelund, 2004). 
 
The post-Mao era has witnessed an even more pronounced shift from 
uniformity to diversity.  The factionalism and elite conflict model and its 
clientalist counterpart have brought into greater focus the centrifugal forces 
fuelling disagreements among high-ranking decision makers and their 
followers.  These constructs have also incorporated non-ideological elements 
into the fragile policy equation, mostly in the form of intensely personal 
patron-client networks (such networks are sustained by ties of mutual 
obligation between leaders and their supporters; Nathan, 1973; Christiansen 
and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 2004). 
 
The interest groups model has stretched the notion of diversity further.  The 
collective entities whose preponderance in the political arena and the strategic 
leverage they enjoy it highlights are aggregates ‚of persons who possess 
certain common characteristics and share certain attitudes on public issues, 
and who adopt certain positions on these issues and make definite claims on 
those in authority‛ (Christiansen and Rai, 1996, p. 13).  Socialist societies are 
not immune to interest groups politics and China has proved a fertile ground 
for researchers favourably disposed towards this idea, which was initially 
perceived as somewhat unconventional (Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 
1999; Heggelund, 2004). 
 
The culturalist model enhances the understanding of the traditional 
foundations upon which patron-client networks in China rest.  The 
underlying assumption is that ‚in various ways the historical events and 
structures of thought in the past determine the present‛ (Christiansen and Rai, 
1996, p. 21).  Traditional cultural values play a prominent role in shaping 
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institutional forms and behavioural propensities.  In the Chinese context, this 
means that personal relations (guanxi) are a more crucial determinant of 
decision outcomes than issue-specific considerations (Pye, 1968; Pye, 1985; 
Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 2004). 
 
The bureaucratic construct embodies the features of Model III developed by 
scholars who dissected policy responses during the Cuban missile crisis.  It is 
based on the premise that diversity pervades not merely the corridors of 
political power in China, but is also a quintessentially bureaucratic 
phenomenon.  Actors in this institutional domain bargain vigorously and this 
is a multi-directional process which takes place at all levels of the bureaucratic 
pyramid and, again, is not necessarily driven by issue-specific factors 
(Lampton, 1987a; Lampton, 1987b; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Lieberthal 
and Lampton, 1992; Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 
2004). 
 
Politico-bureaucratic diversity in China is believed to be so widespread that 
the constructs (particularly the bureaucratic variant) endeavouring to capture 
it have metamorphosed into the fragmented authoritarianism model.  The latter 
reflects the disjointness, incoherence, inconsistency and segmentation that 
characterize the institutional modus operandi, organizational structure and 
public decision making in the country.  Several influences account for this 
pattern, cultural traditions being merely one of them (Lampton, 1987a; 
Lampton, 1987b; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton, 
1992; Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 2004). 
 
Perhaps the most prominent source of institutional fragmentation is the deep 
hierarchical divide between the political centre (zhongyang) and the 
locale/geographical periphery (difang).  This phenomenon is attributable to far-
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reaching (possibly excessive) administrative decentralization, fusion of 
commercial and political interests at the sub-national level (resulting in 
capture of the latter by the former and incentive incompatibility between 
central and local government) and the sheer size of the country (Lampton, 
1987a; Lampton, 1987b; Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992; Sinkule and Ortolano, 
1995; Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 2004).  Distance 
from Beijing tends to aggravate the problem, a situation best exemplified by 
an expression commonly encountered in the southern province of Guangdong 
(‚the heavens are high and the emperor is far away‛/tian gao huangdi yuan; 
Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995, p. 13). 
 
Another factor contributing significantly to institutional fragmentation is the 
so-called system (xitong), or the exceptionally loose amalgam of virtually self-
contained vertical functional hierarchies that stretches uncomfortably from 
Beijing to the local units.  Each central government organ has its own xitong 
and the cooperation between these organizational arms is minimal.  A 
particularly thorny issue that arises in this context is the vague relationship 
between the vertical functional hierarchies (line/tiaotiao) and the horizontal 
governing bodies (piece/kuaikuai).  It is not clear who is supposed to serve 
whom, which undermines organizational coordination (Lampton, 1987a; 
Lampton, 1987b; Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995; 
Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; Heggelund, 2004). 
 
This coincides with a pattern of overlapping authority (too many mothers-in-law”) 
which renders decisive institutional action a distinctly challenging 
proposition.  A provincial government department is thus typically 
subordinate to both the provincial government itself and a relevant central 
ministry.  A subtle distinction between leadership relations (lingdao guanxi) and 
business/professional relations (yewu guanxi) is expected to govern the flow of 
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authority in a parallel fashion, but it is fundamentally unworkable and highly 
confusing (Lampton, 1987a; Lampton, 1987b; Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992; 
Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995; Christiansen and Rai, 1996; Huang, 1999; 
Heggelund, 2004). 
 
All those symptoms of institutional fragmentation manifest themselves 
acutely in the environmental domain because ecological preservation has 
been regarded traditionally as subservient to material welfare and has been 
approached in an haphazard fashion (Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995; Breslin, 
1996; Jahiel, 1998; Ma and Ortolano, 2000; Murray and Cook, 2002; Economy, 
2004; Elvin, 2004; Heggelund, 2004; Day, 2005; Carter and Mole, 2007; 
Mushkat, 2008; Mushkat 2009).  This is also a policy realm where adverse 
cultural influences come strongly into play and impede strategy 
implementation.  Environmental researchers have highlighted the relevance 
of concerns about losing face, penchant for ambiguity, preference for informal 
conflict resolution mechanisms (mediation and conciliation) rather than 
adjudication and, most tellingly, extensive reliance on guanxi/social 
connections (Ma and Ortolano, 2000). 
 
The corollary is that the chasm between strategic aspirations and institutional 
performance remains substantial.  A similar observation may be made, even 
more emphatically, with respect to the gap between the former and ecological 
realities on the ground.  Policy management has improved considerably, but 
it still leaves much to be desired, particularly in terms of implementation 
effectiveness.  Despite wide-ranging efforts to augment the cohesion, 
professionalism, size and status of the environmental protection apparatus, 
the process continues to be characterized by a deflection of strategic objectives, 
dilemmas of administration (i.e., resistance to pressures to control behaviour 
administratively), dissipation of energies and diversion of resources (Sinkule 
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and Ortolano, 1995; Breslin, 1996; Jahiel, 1998; Ma and Ortolano, 2000; Murray 
and Cook, 2002; Economy, 2004; Heggelund, 2004; Day, 2005; Carter and Mole, 
2007; Mushkat, 2008; Mushkat, 2009). 
 
Given this backdrop, marketization alone may not prove to be a panacea, at 
least in the short/medium-term.  It is apparent that the malfunctioning of 
ecological policy-making machinery cannot be confronted in isolation.  Rather, 
it should be faced in the context of comprehensive reform geared towards 
minimizing manifestations of institutional fragmentation.  By the same token, 
it is essential to enhance further, and meaningfully, the capabilities and 
position of the environmental protection agency.  Its elevation to full 
ministerial rank in 1998 was a significant step forward, but arguably not a 
sufficient one in light of the magnitude of the problem.  Symptoms of 
organizational disarray vary inversely with the institutional level.  They are 
relatively modest at the apex of the politico-bureaucratic pyramid and it 
might thus be desirable to place formally the responsibility for ecological 
preservation with authorities near the very top of this elaborate structure. 
 
Empowerment must be accompanied by insulation, as effective as realistically 
possible.  Regulatory capture is rampant in the environmental domain.  Goal 
deflection is the upshot, whereby ecological preservation is sacrificed on the 
altar of commercial interests, whether private or public-private.  Last but not 
least, the grassroots environmental movement in general, and the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly active in this sphere in 
particular, should be allowed to develop in an orderly fashion and exercise 
their voice without being trampled upon.  Logic suggests that, when top-
down regulation fails, be it due to flawed conception or inadequate 
implementation, bottom-up pressures need to serve as a countervailing force.   
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That logic is grounded in the notion of responsive regulation.  This idea, in 
turn, is closely aligned with that of tripartism, which is defined as ‚a 
regulatory policy that fosters the participation of [public interest groups] 
*PIGs+ in the regulatory process‛ (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992, p. 57).  Three 
procedural strategies are employed to this end.  First, PIGs and all their 
members are granted full access to the information available to the regulator.  
Second, they are offered a seat at the negotiating table with the regulatee and 
the regulator when the control parameters are under consideration.  Third, 
they are provided with the same standing to sue or prosecute under 
regulatory statute as the regulator (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992).  The fine 
details of this blueprint may elude China for some time to come, but it may 
seek inspiration from the underlying principles. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The persistent deterioration in ecological conditions, coupled with a growing 
awareness of the far-reaching ramifications of mounting threats to 
sustainability, has spawned a substantial and rapidly burgeoning literature 
on the effectiveness/consequences of environmental governance regimes.  The 
knowledge acquired as a result is valuable both in the theoretical and 
practical sense of the term.  The academic and policy communities have 
gained a deep insight into the determinants of regime performance, as well as 
the output/outcome/impact side, and their members are much better 
equipped than in the past to play the role of regime architects. 
 
One issue carefully addressed in recent years has been that of the fit between 
the governance regime and the biophysical system which it aims to safeguard.  
A related question pertains to the match between the former and the socio-
institutional milieu which underpins it.  The Chinese experience, 
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contemporary and pre-modern, suggests that this dimension of the picture 
cannot be overlooked.  The linkages extend in at least three directions, rather 
than two, and this complexity needs arguably to be duly reflected both in 
pure research and applied work oriented towards the fulfilment of specific 
environmental goals (see also Gunningham, 2009). 
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